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Introduction  
Within Psychology there are two distinct traditions that take memory as their object 
of concern. The most visible is the cognitive-experimental approach, which studies 
the mental architecture that underpins processes of remembering and forgetting. 
The other is the discursive approach (sometimes referred to as Discursive 
Psychology), which treats remembering as a social activity that is accomplished 
through interaction. To say that there are significant differences between these two 
communities of psychologists would be to understate matters rather. For example, 
in response to a target article in The Psychologist (Edwards, Middleton & Potter, 
1992) outlining the principles of a ‘Discursive Action Model’ (DAM) of remembering, 
two eminent experimental psychologists offered the following evaluation:  
 
we have tried several times to comprehend the nine tenets of DAM … but … 
fear that we have failed. The model seems so general that is excludes nothing 
… At one point in our efforts to understand discursive remembering we 
looked up discursive in the Oxford American Dictionary (1980) and were 
informed discursive means ‘rambling from one subject to another’. Just so. 
(Roediger & Wheeler, 1992: 453)i 
 
Statements of this kind – there are similar choice examples that we could cite 
from authors in the discursive camp – leave precious little by way of scope for a 
conversation. But they also mask the true extent to which current work in each 
tradition is beginning to converge on some common issues. Work on 
‘Autobiographical Memory’, for instance, is increasingly concerned with how 
recollections of the past are shaped by the ongoing needs and projects of the present 
self and with the cultural communities that shape its emergence and development 
(Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Nelson, 2009). Similarly, discursive work has 
acknowledged the need to grasp how continuities and discontinuities in episodes of 
remembering are fitted into a broader notion of experience (Middleton & Brown, 
2005). Both approaches may then be said to concern themselves with the functional 
significance of memory, that is, the role of the past in creating and/or maintaining 
current self and identity.  
 
In this paper, our aim is not arrive at a reconciliation of the two traditions, but 
rather to engage in a dialogue around how concepts of continuity, time, context and 
experience have emerged, and might be tackled as shared concerns. To do so we 
must get past a number of obvious and rather intractable differences. The cognitive-
experimental and discursive approaches are distinct from one another with respect 
to their fundamental ontology, styles of theorizing, methodological preferences and 
modes of application. There is remarkably little compatibility here, let alone 
possibilities for synthesis. But if we take a genealogical perspective, we can see that 
there is a shared problematisation. Surprisingly, this appears at first to have nothing 
to do with memory. It is instead the question of how best to understand adult-child 
interactions. 
 
Developmental psychology is the sub-discipline principally concerned with 
human ontogeny. Following the agenda set by Jean Piaget, developmental 
psychology took the development of thinking – notably the ability to deduce 
causal relations in the physical world and subsequently the capacity for symbolic 
representation – as its object of study. This was consolidated during the so-called 
‘cognitive revolution’, which provided a vocabulary for describing mental 
processes drawn from information science and cybernetics (Richards, 2009). 
Research in this area has traditionally practiced a mixture of observation, 
interviews, psychometric testing and formal experiments. Each of these methods 
necessarily involves some degree of adult-child interaction in order for the 
researcher to access the mental ‘inner world’ of the child. This raises the 
problem of bias, the extent to which the behaviour of the child participant is 
shaped by way they interact with either the researcher or with the features of 
the research setting. It was in the course of considering this problem of bias that 
developmental psychologists noticed an interesting phenomenon. Children are 
typically not passive participants in research settings (see Wood & Middleton 
1974). They look for clues and hints as to how to respond to the questions they 
are asked or the tasks they are set. And when child participants are accompanied 
by parents or carers, a subtle interaction occurs where the adults provide helpful 
guidance, both direct and indirect, that assist the child in framing the problem at 
hand. Jerome Bruner and colleagues termed such interaction ‘scaffolding’ (Wood, 
Bruner & Ross, 1975). 
 
In what sense is ‘scaffolding’ a memory problem? The core feature of scaffolding 
is the parent facilitating the child’s self-reflection upon past experience. This 
coming together of social interaction and remembering is a persistent theme in 
the history of psychology. William James famously placed a chapter on memory 
at the exact mid-way point of The Principles of Psychology, where it served as a 
bridge between a discussion of the continuity of experience within the ‘stream of 
thought’, and the perception of matters at hand in ongoing interaction. The 
problem, as James put it, was that although ‘the stream of thought flows on’ the 
majority ‘of its segments fall into the bottomless abyss of oblivion’ (p.643). It is 
therefore necessary to consider the recovery of these ‘segments’ through 
reflective acts – ‘memory proper [is] the knowledge of an event, or fact, of which 
meantime we have not been thinking, with the additional consciousness that we 
have thought or experienced it before’ (p.648, original italics). Memory sits at the 
crossroads of two directions in which experience extends – one axis stretches 
back towards the past and forward to an anticipated future, the other axis 
mobilizes memory to inform our current actions in relation to the changing 
world around us. James’ fellow pragmatist, John Dewey, offered the following 
characterization: 
 
The two principles of continuity and interaction are not separated from 
each other. They intercept and unite. They are so to speak, the 
longitudinal and the lateral aspects of experience. (Dewey, 1938: 44) 
 
Our experiences of daily matters at hand are not disconnected from our ongoing 
sense of who and what we are over time. They ‘intercept and unite’ as though 
together they formed the co-ordinates in a cartography of possible experiences. 
Through interaction with others, we ‘turn around’ on our experiences and 
mobilize the past to create continuities, to fit the present into putative 
trajectories of experiences that create a sense of identity. The great early 
psychologist of memory, Frederic Bartlett (1932) made this turning around on 
the ordering of experience central to his expanded conception of memory (see 
Wagoner, forthcoming). Like Dewey, he recognized that interactions where we 
are guided or instructed by others in our efforts to establish the relevance of the 
past to the present were especially important.  
 
Across the history of psychology, we see the continuous re-appearance of 
‘instruction’ in relation to memory as a pivotal matter of concern. This is framed 
on the majority of occasions with regard to the intergenerational transmission of 
knowledge, typically in the form of adult-child interaction. ‘Scaffolding’ is one of 
many successive efforts to grasp how memory is engaged with the social and 
cultural complexities of such interactions. It is possible, of course, to treat this 
matter strictly with respect to the accuracy or reliability of the outputs of the 
process. This is what Elizabeth Loftus (1994) has done in her efforts to debunk 
the notion of ‘recovered memory’, which sees adult-child interaction, and their 
subsequent recollection, as the source of ‘false’ continuities and errors in 
remembering. However, we might call this a ‘restricted’ view of memory, in 
contrast to the ‘expanded’ view offered by Dewey, Bartlett and Bruner, and also 
in contemporary work in both autobiographical memory and discursive 
psychology. 
 
What we will be seeking to do in what follows is to show how work in the 
discursive tradition develops this expanded view of memory and how this 
relates to parallel developments that are occurring in the cognitive-experimental 
tradition. As far as possible, we will try to bracket away philosophical and 
methodological differences between the traditions, so that we can focus on 
points of intersection around emergent concerns. What we will call for is not 
synthesis or resolution, but rather a guarded rapprochement. In the next section 
we will briefly describe some of the themes of the expanded view in 
autobiographical memory studies. We then turn to the development of the 
discursive approach, before situating our own recent work in that tradition. 
Finally, we will identify three points – continuity, normativity and setting-
specificity – where we feel a future dialogue across the traditions could be 
usefully pursued. 
 
Autobiographical memory studies 
In the early 1970’s, developmental psychology had begun to develop a ‘skills 
based paradigm’ that proposed that children’s psychological capacities were 
shaped and progressively developed by the ways they interacted with others in 
varying social contexts (Wood & Middleton, 1974). Experiments where children 
were supervised by parents/carers in completing tasks (such as constructing a 
pyramid from wooden blocks) demonstrated that children did not simply imitate 
or passively follow guidance given by adults, but instead participated in a jointly 
shared ‘action programme’. The child looked to the adult as the person ‘in the 
know’, whilst the adult sought to ‘scaffold’ the activity. This took the form of 
progressively steering the child through the task by managing the complexity of 
its various components through directing attention, modelling, maintaining 
direction etc (Wood, Bruner & Ross, 1975). Subsequent work drew on the 
writings of Lev Vygotsky (1978) to produce a richer conception of the context in 
which scaffolding operated. Whilst parent-child (and child-child) interactions 
remained the empirical focus, development was now seen as expansion of the 
child’s moral-practical-conceptual world (or ‘umwelt’) through engagement with 
others (Shotter & Newson, 1982). Children learn who and what they are through 
the way they engage with instruction - both informal and formal - provided by 
others who are more ‘in the know’ (usually adults), who draw in turn on the 
wider cultural norms and practices of the social settings they inhabit.   
 
Remembering is fundamental to this instruction. From as young as 16 months 
old, parents/carers routinely scaffold the personal experiences of children by 
asking sequences of questions about the recent past – ‘For example, the mother 
will ask, ‘‘Did we have fun at the park today? What did we do? Did we go on the 
swings?’’ and wait for some confirmation by the child before continuing, ‘‘Yes, 
and didn’t we swing high? Wasn’t that fun?’’’ (Fivush et al, 2011: 323). Since 
children of this age are barely able to participate in the shared act of recollection, 
Fivush (2007) argues that the purpose of such interactions is to instruct the child 
in the critical importance of telling and sharing the past. Bruner’s own work in 
the 1980s moved in this direction, emphasising the role of autobiographical 
narratives in lending shape to personal experience and thereby underpinning a 
sense of self and continuity through time (see Bruner, 1986, 1990). Katherine 
Nelson (1989, 1991) shows how narratives are co-constructed in such a way that 
the child can both place themselves in relation to past events and ‘turn around’ 
on what they recall in order to tell stories about themselves from memory. The 
interactional structuring of personal narratives leads the child to position 
themselves within a broader cultural domain. For example, gendered styles of 
telling stories about oneself appear by the age of 4, and explicit cultural 
differences appear in autobiographical narratives by age 6 (Fivush et al, 2011). 
This can be seen as a dynamic relationship, where the child is both shaped by the 
world and acts to shape the world around them, a cycle of ‘mutual constitution’ 
(Markus & Kitiyama, 2010).  
 
The cognitive-experimental approach has built on the model of the child as an 
active participant in co-construction of the past. This is particularly evident in 
Martin Conway’s influential cognitive psychological model of autobiographical 
memory and the self-memory system (SMS) which emphasises how our 
memories of particular events are shaped by our current concerns, cognitively 
organised by a set of mental processes they refer to as the ‘working self’. 
(Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). The working self is responsible for organising 
event specific knowledge, and often does so with present concerns in mind. 
However, in more recent work, Conway has extended this formulation of the self 
to incorporate a ‘conceptual self’, whereby memory can be structured and taken 
hold of by cultural convention, such as culturally generated life scripts (e.g. 
marriage, going to college, being a house, having a child) (Conway & Jobson, 
2012). It appears that highly salient life scripts (usually occurring between the 
ages of ten and thirty years of age) are disproportionately represented in adult 
recollections, commonly referred to as the ‘reminiscence bump’ (REF). One 
explanations for this is that this period involves the highest number of ‘first’ 
experiences and new social bonds that have the most dramatic effect on an 
emerging identity and either affirm or disconfirm membership of culture norms 
or groupings (e.g. good wife; responsible citizen). These cultural conventions 
help organise episodic memories, which reflect social and cultural expectations 
(e.g. helping us to also answer questions such as ‘was this normal/expected, 
right/wrong’? etc. 
 
The ‘expanded view’ of memory that runs through this work is mirrored by the 
turn towards different methodological practice and objects. William Hirst and 
colleagues have followed Bruner’s lead in making conversation the focus. Their 
studies have demonstrated that the conversational structuring of recollection 
can inhibit memorial accuracy and induce selective forgetting, whilst at the same 
time act to foster and maintain collective identity (Hirst et al, 2012; Hirst & 
Echterhoff, 2012). Katherine Nelson’s work also uses conversational data, but 
moves outside the laboratory setting to look at naturalistic settings, such as tape 
recordings of bedtime interactions of a two year old infant with her parents 
(Nelson, 2006). The shift towards ‘real world’ settings is consonant with the 
approach taken by Ed Hutchins in his influential study of maritime navigation, 
Cognition in the Wild. The notion of ‘distributed cognition’ that Hutchins 
developed to show how psychological processes become part of larger problem 
solving systems, has been elaborated best in the collaborative work of Amanda 
Barnier, Celia Harris and John Sutton. Using a mixture of experimental and 
qualitative material drawn from older couples jointly remembering, they argue 
they the most appropriate unit of analysis is a ‘transactional memory system’ 
that encompasses both individuals, along with other ‘cognitive technologies’, 
such as diaries, handbags etc (Harris et al, 2010; Sutton et al, 2010).  
 
In summary, this very brief and very partial history of how the cognitive-
experimental tradition has taken an expanded view of autobiography memory to 
be a ‘critical developmental skill’ (cf. Fivush et al, 2011), demonstrates the 
centrality of the problematic of ‘instruction’. Now from a discursive 
psychological perspective, it would be very tempting to raise immediate 
objections to some of the ways in which culture and mind are conceptualised 
here, or with the ongoing use of laboratory based methods. But to do so would be 
to not merely shut down the possibility of a dialogue, but also to stubbornly 
ignore the extent to which there are genuinely shared concerns with interaction, 
‘being in the know’, cultural resources and the mediation of remembering as a 
distributed activity. We will try to pick out these shared concerns as we now turn 
towards the discursive treatment of memory.  
 
The development of Discursive Psychology  
The volume on Collective Remembering edited by David Middleton and Derek 
Edwards in 1990 clearly set out how the discursive approach intended to distance 
itself from the cognitive-experimental tradition. The line was drawn primarily 
around the rejection of experimental methods. Psychological experiments are 
designed to explore the causal effects of varying independent variables (i.e. those 
controlled by the experimenter, such as the information provided by participants, or 
aspects of the environment in which it is presented) upon dependent variables (i.e. a 
measurable response made by the participant, such as the accuracy of their 
subsequent recollections). The logic of experimentation forces a conceptual 
separation between these variables. In the case of memory, this means treating the 
act of recollection as independent of, yet influenced by, the contexts in which 
remembering happens: 
 
In experimental designs, meaning and context are defined as variables, 
factors whose effects on the accuracy of recall are manipulable. In the 
study of discursive remembering, significance and context are intrinsic to 
the activity, constitutive of it and constituted by it, rather than causally 
influential upon some other thing called ‘memory’’ (Middleton & 
Edwards, 1990: 42) 
 
Middleton & Edwards here argue against that separation, claiming that what it 
means to remember something on a given occasion is utterly intrinsic to the 
nature of the act itself. Memory is never independent of the context where it is 
enacted, rather those contexts form an indivisible part of the phenomenon that 
psychologists study. Remembering is then a social accomplishment performed as 
a joint-activity with others, on particular occasions in specific contexts. 
 
What is interesting here is the route by which both authors had arrived at this 
position. The discursive tradition is typically seen as part of social psychology, 
but Middleton and Edwards’ respective backgrounds were in developmental and 
educational psychology. David Middleton had been part of the research group at 
the University of Nottingham who had conducted some of the experimental 
demonstrations of ‘scaffolding’ (Woods & Middleton, 1975). Along with fellow 
member John Shotter, Middleton’s concerns had turned towards an explication 
of the social contexts that shaped the development of psychological capacities. 
Derek Edwards’ early work had dealt with language development in both family 
and classroom settings (see Edwards & Mercer, 1987). Using tape-recorded 
‘naturalistic data’, where the researcher observes and tape-records an activity 
occurring in its usual context, Edwards had argued that lexical development was 
not the gradual accumulation of conceptual understanding, but could be shown 
instead to be part of the everyday pragmatics of adult-child interaction (Edwards 
& Goodwin, 1985). Children use language functionally to ‘do things’ within 
interactional contexts before they can be said to understand the referential 
meaning of the words they acquire. 
 
Given these individual interests, it is unsurprising that their first joint work 
together at Loughborough University (where both would go on to be founding 
members of the internationally renown Discourse & Rhetoric Group - DARG) was 
a quasi-experimental study where student participants were asked to jointly 
recall the feature film E.T.ii The resulting data showed how participants 
constructed a shared understanding of what they were collectively recalling, 
which was systematically built up within the interaction, and involved the use of 
a range of conversational pragmatics. Edwards & Middleton (1986) proposed 
that verbal statements made during the task, such as ‘I remember’ or ‘Don’t you 
recall’, were not verifiable expressions related to an underlying cognitive event, 
but were rather interactional strategies for legitimating or agreeing with or 
hedging jointly accomplished accounts of past event. This is not say that there 
are no cognitive mechanics underpinning public claims to recollection, just that 
the postulation of such processes is not needed to explain the empirical findings. 
Mind could be ‘bracketed out’ from the explanadum (see Coulter, 1979 for a full 
argument). 
 
In subsequent work, Edwards & Middleton (1988) turned towards using 
naturalistic data, but maintained the key scene of ‘instruction’, this time 
involving conversations between adults and children around family 
photographs. The following example comes their study of conversations around 
family photographs. Here a young boy, Paul, and his mother are looking through 
photographs of family holidays: 
 
Example 1 (From Edwards & Middleton, 1988) 
 
Mother: oh look (.) there's when we went to the riding 
[stables wasn't it? 
Paul:  [yeh (.) er er 
Mother: you was trying to reach up and stroke that horse. 
Paul:  where? (laughs) 
Mother: would you like to do that again? 
Paul:  yeh 
Mother: you don't look very happy though 
Paul:  because I thought I was going to fall off 
Mother: you thought you was going to fall off did you? (.) right 
misery (.) daddy was holding on to you so that you didn't 
(1) did it FEEL very bumpy? 
Paul:  yeh. 
Mother: did it make your legs ache? [Paul laughs] Rebecca enjoyed 
it. 
Paul:  yeh 
Mother: she's a bit older wasn't she? (.) you were a little boy  
  there. 
 
In this extract we see how remembering operates as a shared activity. Paul and 
his mother are working together, assisted by the use of the photographs, to 
establish an account of a past event (in this case, a particular family day out). The 
mother offers a series of turns where she makes claims about the past event in 
relation to some aspect of the photograph (‘there’s when we went to the riding 
stables’, ‘you was trying to reach up and stroke the horse’). These are framed as 
interrogative inferences that appoint Paul as the next speaker to respond. In this 
way, Paul is being gradually committed to the account of the past that is being 
progressively built. As the extract progresses, Paul’s mother shifts to offering 
candidate experiential claims – ‘you don’t look very happy though’, ‘you thought 
you was going to fall off did you?’ – which invite completion by Paul, albeit in 
fairly minimal terms (‘yeh’). The details and significance of ‘what happened’ are 
jointly accomplished in the unfolding interaction between parent and child. 
 
The data here bears strong resemblance to the kind of adult-child interactions 
recorded in the scaffolding studies (Wood, Bruner & Ross, 1975) and those 
discussed by Robyn Fivush & Katherine Nelson (e.g. Nelson, 2009). The manner 
in which Paul’s mother steers her son through the activity of remembering could 
certainly be glossed as ‘scaffolding’. However, what is at stake is not merely 
producing an account of the past event, but also establishing its contemporary 
relevance. For example, the question ‘would you like to do that again?’ sets up a 
contrast between Paul’s interests and desires at the time and in the present, as 
does the concluding statement ‘you were a little boy then’. Similarly, the 
statement ‘daddy was holding on you’ responds not just to parental 
accountability at the time, but also serves as a re-statement of an ongoing 
relationship of care. Paul is being actively tutored in not simply telling a story 
about the past, but also how to use that story to demonstrate family 
togetherness. From this perspective, we can treat the various cognitive 
ascriptions of intentions, feelings and emotions as rhetorically organised 
formulations which are designed to establish a continuity between family 
membership and belonging in the recollected past and the present activity of 
shared recollection. This is not to say that matters of accuracy – what ‘really 
happened’, what was ‘really felt’ at the time – are entirely irrelevant, merely that 
they are subservient to the conversational pragmatics of family remembering. 
 
Middleton & Edward’s approach to qualitative data was informed by an 
emerging turn towards Discourse Analysis (DA) in psychology. Initially, this 
developed from work in the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge (SSK), most 
notably Gilbert & Mulkay’s (1984) study of scientific discourse around the nature 
of research (see also Ashmore, 1989). Gilbert & Mulkay had shown that what 
appeared to be contradictions in scientists’ expressed attitudes and beliefs were 
explicable when analysed in the argumentative context in which the utterances 
were made – scientists describe the nature of scientific work differently when 
they are explaining successful and unsuccessful research. Jonathan Potter (who 
had studied with Mulkay) and Margaret Wetherell took this analytic point 
further to propose that the social psychological study of attitudes and 
attributions could be revolutionised through discourse analysis as the study of 
interactionally occasioned and rhetorically organised claims about self and 
others. Their jointly authored Discourse and Social Psychology had an enormous 
methodological impact on the discipline since it finally offered a viable empirical 
strategy in which the conceptual and philosophical alternative to experimental 
psychology could be pushed forward (see Brown & Locke, 2008). 
 
Potter & Wetherell’s work on attitudes and Middleton & Edward’s work on 
memory was brought together under the umbrella Discursive Psychology (see 
Edwards & Potter, 1992a). This revised approach was also highly influenced by 
Conversation Analysis (CA) (see Edwards, 1997). As a consequence, there was an 
explicit rejection of formal theorisation in favour of close readings of transcripts 
of audio recordings. These readings were guided by knowledge of the patterns 
and regularities found in ordinary conversation identified by Harvey Sacks and 
his followers (e.g. Gail Jefferson, Emmanuel Schegloff), such as turn-taking, 
repair and action formulation. Following this approach, Edwards & Potter 
(1992a) argued that if a cognitive process such as memory is studied in the ‘real 
world’ settings within which it is occasioned, the central focus needs to be on the 
conversational pragmatics through which the psychological act is accomplished.  
 
Discursive Psychology emerged at roughly the same time as the ‘expanded view’ 
of memory was gaining pace within cognitive-experimental work. Ulrich Neisser, 
considered one of the ‘founding figures’ of modern cognitive psychology, had 
followed Jerome Bruner in turning toward narrative and contextual treatments 
of memory and self-knowledge (see Neisser, 1982; Fivush & Neisser, 1994). In 
what he dubbed an ‘ecological approach’, Neisser proposed that inconsistencies 
and discontinuities in recollection could be explained by positing a series of 
modes of organising self-knowledge (or simply ‘selves’) that interact with the 
environment in different and sometimes contradictory ways. For Edwards & 
Potter, this kind of theorising is flawed because it retains the notion that it is 
possible to establish the truth or veridicality of a given recollection outside of the 
various transformations wrought on that information by a hypothetical self-
system. The problem needs to be turned inside out – rather than seek to evaluate 
episodic memories against ‘what actually happened’, we must study claims to 
memorial accuracy as social actions in their own right that seek to accomplish 
local interactional goals. 
 
The contrast is clear in Edwards & Potter’s (1992b) treatment of Neisser’s 
(1981) famous study of the testimony given by John Dean to the Watergate 
hearings.  In this work, Neisser argues that when Dean’s testimony to the Senate 
committee is compared to the transcripts of some of the original conversations 
with Richard Nixon and others that he is recalling, it is clear that Dean 
misremembers details considerably. But, at another level, his characterisation 
and general account captures much of the nature of ‘what happened’. By 
contrast, Edwards & Potter (1992b) propose that what is analytically interesting 
here is to look at how the participants in the Watergate hearings (including 
Dean) fit their claims about what happened into the evolving conversational 
contingencies of the hearings. They offer a counter example from the UK, 
involving contested accounts of what was said in a private off-the-record press 
briefing given by the then Chancellor of the Exchequer, Nigel Lawson in 1988. 
Lawson’s account of not just what he said, but the correct interpretation of those 
words, was at odds with those of the journalists present, resulting in a major 
public dispute. Edwards & Potter show through careful analysis of media reports 
how the various claims were established and warranted through the use of 
discursive devices. For example, the following extract comes from an exchange in 
the House of Parliament: 
 
Example 2 (from Edwards & Potter, 1992b) 
 
Mr Lawson: … the statements that appeared in the press on Sunday bore 
no relations whatever to what I in fact said. What I have said to them is 
that, while we were absolutely, totally committed to maintaining- 
Ms Clare Short (Birmingham, Ladywood) They will have their shorthand 
notes. 
Mr Lawson: Oh yes, they will have their shorthand notes and they will 
know it, and they will know they went behind afterwards and they 
thought there was not a good enough story and so they produced that 
(Hansard, 7 November) 
 
Edwards & Potter note that a variety of strategies were used by each side 
(Lawson, the journalists) to discount to version of events given by one another. 
Some media articles had blamed Lawson’s efforts at denying the reports on his 
‘arrogance’. This strategy of appealing to psychological dispositions was not 
possible for Lawson – it would be implausible to claim that all the journalists in 
the room had faulty memories. What he does instead in the Parliamentary 
exchange above is to readily admit that not only were the journalists in 
agreement, but that also a record of the conversation exists in the form of 
shorthand notes. But he then follows this with a claim that the interpretations of 
the briefing reported in the media were erroneous because the journalists, under 
pressure to come up with a ‘good enough story’, subsequently colluded to 
construct a different version of events - recollection was wilfully distorted by 
institutional forces. Now the point of this is not to say that Lawson’s version of 
events is any more or less accurate than that of the journalists, but rather to 
understand how these rival versions are constructed and the rhetorical and 
political work that they do.  
 
Discursive Psychology, as developed by Edwards & Potter, is noteworthy 
because it insists on the considerable interactional skills of ordinary people. In 
tune with Fivush et al’s (2011) call for the study of autobiographical memory as 
a ‘critical developmental skill’, Discursive Psychology rejects a ‘deficit model’ of 
memory, in favour of highlighting the complexity and subtlety of the social acts 
that we all accomplish, from a very early age, when we make claims about the 
past. For Edwards & Potter, psychology ought to be principally concerned with 
social development and enactment of these abilities. Psychology loses its way 
when it appeals to a concept of ‘mind’ (and private ‘cognition’) as an explanation 
of action without having first grasped the situated, contextual nature of the 
activities such as remembering: 
 
Mind can be studied as intrinsically social and contextualised; it makes 
sense to begin with no a priori separation of person/mind from its 
embodiment in communicative practices. It is both possible and fruitful to 
pursue the study of action itself – accounts, versions, constructions – as 
discursive activity. Rather than offering us a window upon the workings 
of something else called ‘mind’, discourse can be examined for how 
speakers orient themselves to notions of mind, using these as resources in 
conversation (such as in framing accounts of truth and falsity, 
accomplishing blamings and excuses, mitigations and accusations, 
explanations of why people do what they do, and so on). Our 
recommendation is to let go of a commitment to mind as a pre-existing, 
independently knowable explanation of talk and action (Edwards & 
Potter, 1992b: 211)  
 
Here we can see the return of what we earlier called the ‘intractable differences’ 
between approaches. Despite a high degree of common cause on context, 
pragmatics, function and reconstruction in memory, Edwards & Potter 
‘recommend’ that central organising concept in the cognitive-experimental 
tradition – mind as the engine that drives action – be ‘let go’. As Edwards, 
Middleton & Potter (1992) found, forcing the point in this way tends to curtail 
rather than foster dialogue. A better way forward, perhaps, is to ask what it is 
that the concept of mind provides. Classically, psychology has wanted two things 
from ‘mind’ – a locus for the skills that underpin psychological operations and a 
principle of personal continuity over time (hence the derivation of psychology 
from the ancient greek term psuche meaning ‘breath of life’ or ‘soul’). The first 
requirement can be readily reformulated to ease the differences. The 
sociocultural model of autobiographical memory and the ‘extended cognition’ 
approach, share the desire of Discursive Psychologists to reject the a priori 
separation of person/mind from communicative/cultural practices. The second 
is more difficult. Is it possible to conceptualise a notion of personal continuity 
over time that exceeds the conversational pragmatics of recollection without 
necessarily committing us to ‘something else’ called ‘mind’? Or is such a notion 
merely itself an interactionally occasioned formulation that needs to be analysed 
discursively? Put slightly differently, if recollection is the occasioned production 
of versions of personal pasts, then how do we name and reflect upon the huge set 
of versions that each of us accrues over time? 
 
The Social Psychology of Experience 
David Middleton’s work in the 1990s followed a different trajectory to Discursive 
Psychology. Influenced by work in Sociocultural Psychology (see Valsiner & 
Rosa, 2007), Middleton became increasingly concerned with the problem of how 
individuals cede their memorial concerns to a notion of collectivity (see 
Middleton, 1997a, 1997b, 2002). That is to say, how we invoke the idea of a 
group, organisation or nation to underline that the meaning and importance of 
what we are remembering is ‘bigger’ than us alone – it is a concern that either is 
or ought to be shared by many others. Middleton characterised this as an 
‘interdependency’ between personal and collective experiences that was shaped 
through recollection. We cannot think of personal experience as distinct from the 
social milieus where it has meaning. 
 
The relationship between the continuity and interdependency of personal and 
collective memory was taken up in a different way in Middleton & Brown’s The 
Social Psychology of Experience. Drawing on the philosophy of Henri Bergson, 
Middleton & Brown (2005) situate memory within ‘duration’. Bergson 
(1908/1991) argued that the time we live is not social or ‘clock time’, which can 
be neatly divided into measurable instants, but rather an ongoing indivisible 
flow – or ‘duration’ –which we experience as expanding and dilating according to 
our needs and concerns. Since duration is not divided within itself, we are 
perpetually connected to the entirety of past experience. From this it follows that 
the question concerning memory is not around the recall of the past, but rather 
how to disconnect or hold back the enormity of the past, to prevent it from 
overwhelming the present. This is accomplished through the interdependency of 
our own duration with that of others, and through a range of social and material 
practices, described in the work of Maurice Halbwachs (1980; 1992). The 
continuity of personal experience is punctuated and disrupted by the ‘collective 
frameworks’ we share with others, and which extend into artefacts and places. 
These enable us to turn around on our experiences and see new patterns and 
temporal relationships, such that the past is never really ‘over’ but is instead 
continuously active in transforming the present. Put in cognitive terms, we might 
say that given the perpetual availability of personal experience (as duration), 
collective remembering involves the social management of the accessibility of a 
given portion of that experience (see Conway, 2008).  
 
Take the following example, which originates from Buchanan and Middleton’s 
(1995) study of elderly people participating in a reminiscence group session: 
 
Example 3 (from Buchanan & Middleton, 1995)   
 
Vera: my mother used to wear erm (.)  sack apron (.)  cos years ago they 
used to make the aprons out of a (.)  sack bag hadn't they 
Doris: [ooh that's right 
Enid: [you could buy [the sack bag (…) 
Vera:      [can you remember (.)  I can remember  
[my mother (.)  and she used to- 
Jean: [yes (.)  yes (.) used to make aprons out the sack bags or a black 
one (.)  and you'd go and change after dinner and she’d put (.)  you 
know (.)  a new pinafore and a clean dress or something like that  
Enid: we used to buy ours from the Beehive  
Vera: ye:s (.)  I can see my mother (.)  she used (…) sack bag y’know (.)   
[of her back and her front- 
Jean:   [yeah (.)  that's wash day 
 
Here Vera is recalling her mother, with support and elaboration from Doris, Enid 
and Jean. What interests Middleton & Brown (2005: 145-149) is the direction 
this recollection takes. Vera is not describing any particular episode; she focuses 
instead on an item of clothing, a ‘sack apron’. Together the women begin to 
unpack various facets of the sack bag – when it would be worn, how they were 
made, where the materials would be purchased etc. The world inhabited by the 
Mother gradually emerges, a time when women would ‘make do’ with garments 
fashioned from cheap materials whilst engaged in domestic labour, but would 
also change into fresh clothes in the evening. Out of the mass of possible versions 
of the past involving Vera’s mother, the women jointly stabilise or fix this 
particular ‘habitable world’ with its own moral universe and relations between 
people and artefacts. The past is then worked up and shaped in the present as 
the speakers’ own particular durations are made to intersect, and are 
‘punctualised’ or rendered cohesive through the mutual orientation to the 
features of particular objects and places. 
 
Middleton & Brown’s (2005) work appeared at the time when a number of 
critical psychologists were attempting to reclaim the notion of ‘experience’ (see 
also Bradley, 2005; Stephenson & Papadopoulos, 2006). The phrase is usually 
associated with Humanistic Psychology, with its central image of a bounded, self-
contained psychological subject. However, following the efforts to ‘de-subjectify’ 
the psychological initiated in the work of Foucault and Deleuze, amongst others 
(see Brown & Stenner, 2009), it is possible to treat experience as emergent from 
and shared across persons and the material world with which they interact. Our 
experiences are not then entirely ‘ours’, but are interdependent with others and 
with things (Reavey, 2010). This is well illustrated in the following example, 
taken from Helen Hewitt’s study of life story work with persons with severe 
learning difficulties. Here a father describes two linked events around his son, 
Lance: 
 
 Extract 4 (from Hewitt, 1997) 
 
Father: (....) (.) this is basically it (.) all I can literally add to it (.) or 
say (.) there’s not much I know but (.) 
Interviewer:  oh no I’m sure there’s a lot more rea::lly I mean (.) there’s 
special memories that you’ve got of sort of (.) of isolated 
events that (.) you know (.) I mean I’m sure you must have a 
lot of photographs haven’t you?  
Father: oh yes if you want photographs but uh (.) he was a (.) 
wheelchair case (or should a say pramulator) and (.) most 
of the time he sat in his chair (.) one of those chairs like that 
and he became quite (paralyzed) but he has a memory (.) 
that’s one thing that I would tell you (.) and the reason that 
I know this is becau:se in Australia (.) he used to have a 
chair that used to (stand) (.) and have these springs that 
went across (.) and he used to put his hand on one of these 
things and twang them (.) and of course with it being on a 
wooden floor (.) because there they have wooden floors (.) 
it was just like a double bass  
Interviewer: (laughing) like a digeree-doo  
Father: and he used to love this (.) you know (.) he’d really get 
excited by it (.) well (.) we took him away (.) and it must 
have been ten years later that we bought a chair that was 
similar to that (.) and do you know the first thing he did his 
hand went straight underneath[  
 Interviewer:                  [and twanged it[ 
 Father:                                          [ten years  
later (.) so he’s got a memory (.) now if he thinks about that 
what other memories has he got about other (.) so:: (.) he 
wasn’t a cabbage (.) there was something in there ((points 
to head)) that was (.) functioning somewhere (.) although 
he couldn’t express it (.) it was there (.) but he uh (.) we 
were amazed he just sat in this chair (.) we sat him in this 
chair never never (thought of) and the first thing he did his 
hand went straight under (.) well he tried to do it (.) he 
didn’t quite make it but that’s what he wanted to do 
because he used to like (.) and that was ten years earlier (.) 
he was quite grown up then (.) so honestly he thought 
about this noise (.) or music or whatever and he wanted to 
do it again (.) and he knew how to make that (.) that sound 
so he could put pieces together to make something which 
was functional to to himself  
 
At the start of the extract, Lance’s father is asked for ‘special memories’ about his 
son, using the cue of family photographs. This occasions a recollection about an 
incident when the family were living in Australia. Lance’s father introduces this 
recollection as demonstrating that although he has considerable physical and 
learning challenges, Lance does ‘have a memory’. Whilst this exemplifies 
Middleton & Edwards’ (1990) point about ‘meta-cognition’ that memory talk 
often involves talk around what memory is, more importantly, in the turns that 
follow, the father points to an interaction with a particular chair as evidence for 
his claim about Lance’s abilities. The twanging of the springs extended Lance’s 
range of actions and gave him the means of showing pleasure and involvement in 
the world around him. Middleton & Brown (2005), using the vocabulary of 
sociocultural psychology, observe that, as an artefact, the chair appears to have 
created a new form of mediated action that allowed for expanded psychological 
capacities.  
 
The father then goes on to describe how ten years later and many miles away 
from Australia, Lance encountered a similar chair. He once again sought to twang 
the springs. Although this was unsuccessful, the chair again allowed for 
expanded psychological capacities, this time demonstrating through his explicit 
act of recall that ‘he wasn’t a cabbage’, that there ‘was something in there … that 
was functioning’. It is the displacement of the chair across time and space that 
makes these expanded psychological capacities present. In this sense, Lance’s 
psychological abilities – including memory – are interdependent with the chair. 
He is performed as an individual by virtue of his attachment to the chair across 
both episodes. At the same time, the family relationships between Father and 
Son are facilitated and marked out by their joint relationship to the chair. The 
artefact mediates what the family members are to each other. This mediation 
extends temporally – it is the material similarity of the chairs over the two 
episodes that serves as the basis for the emotional and psychological continuity 
which is performed in this extract. As Middleton & Brown put it ‘the 
displacement of the artefact is precisely what enables a linkage between two 
otherwise remote points in time. The chair opens up a kind of ‘envelope’ of time 
where a continuity which was absent is now immediately present’ (2005: 156). 
 
Middleton & Brown’s broader claim is that remembering is the means by which 
we turn around on the interdependencies in our temporally structured 
experience (i.e. overlapping durations). And whilst remembering happens partly 
through talk, analysis cannot be limited to a strict focus on conversational 
interaction because of the importance of material mediation through artefacts 
and settings, along with our embodied participation in the worlds (or ‘zones of 
personal relations’) that are made actual through recollection. However, 
Middleton & Brown do not distinguish particularly between different types of 
settings or communities. The philosopher Sue Campbell (2009) observes that 
Middleton & Brown concentrate on examples where participants affirm the 
values and meanings in the ‘habitable worlds’ of the past they jointly construct. 
But in many cases, she argues, ‘the very intent of drawing someone into the past 
may be to encourage the contesting rather than the affirmation of values’ (2009: 
223). If we follow Campbell’s argument then this suggests that far greater 
attention needs to be given to the nature of both the setting and the activity 
through which recollection is performed than Middleton & Brown are prepared 
to allow. Moreover, that the content and meanings of what are being recollected 
are of paramount importance. It really matters whether the world that is being 
performed through memory is one in which we can live and whose values we 
share or, conversely, is one that is difficult, distressing and conflicted. 
 
Vital Memories 
Over the past few years, we have worked across a series of studies with groups 
of participants who have ‘trouble’ with some aspect of their past or that of others 
they care for – these include adult survivors of child sexual abuse (Reavey, 1998; 
Reavey & Brown, 2006; 2009); parents conducting life story work with their 
adopted children (Brookfield et al, 2008; Brown et al, 2013); persons affected by 
the 2005 London Bombings (Allen & Brown, 2011); elderly users of a 
reminiscence museum (Bendien et al, 2010) and forensic mental health service 
users in medium-secure settings (Brown, Reavey et al, in press). In each case, the 
groups involved have very specific ‘memory problems’. Survivors of child sexual 
abuse, for example, have to manage conflicts and ambiguities in their 
recollections of past events, along with the potential significance this has for 
their current sense of agency. Conversely, elderly residents in care home settings 
may have difficulty in reconciling their present limitations around personal 
autonomy with self-identity, and may draw upon autobiographical memories as 
resources to ‘turn around’ on their current situation.  
 
Despite the clear difference, there are a number of common issues that run 
across these distinct memory problems. First, they concern a distinct sub-set of 
autobiographical memories. These are typically structured as a series of episodic 
memories, often concerning a key personal relationship, which have an ongoing 
and intractable relevance to a current sense of self. We use the term ‘vital 
memories’ to indicate that these particular autobiographical memories are 
difficult to manage, often threatening and destabilising, whilst at the same time 
felt to be utterly necessary and self-defining. Second, there are usually strong 
normative constraints that need to be oriented towards when recollecting vital 
memories. These can range from cultural expectations around the meaning and 
significance of what is remembered – such as a ‘victim’ status around memories 
of abuse – to ethical norms about what ought and ought not to be recalled – as 
with the responsibilities that adoptive parents feel in protecting adopted 
children from prematurely hearing the full details of difficult events that have 
occurred their early life. Third, particular settings and practices tend to mediate 
remembering along defined lines. For example, the prior personal and sexual 
relationships of patients in secure forensic mental health care settings are taken 
to be not relevant to their current situation, meaning that patients are effectively 
required to ‘park’ or ‘amputate’ their sexual history until such time as they exit 
secure care.  
 
These three issues can all be seen at work in the following extract, where 
adoptive parents are together discussing their approach to ‘life story work’. This 
involves maintaining a document in which the life of an adopted child, including 
that part of it that pre-dates the point where they were adopted by the current 
parent(s), is documented, typically the form of a physical book which includes 
narratives and photographs (see Brookfield et al, 2008). Life story work 
crystallises a particular memory problem for adoptive parents. It can be difficult 
to ensure that the life story book is sufficiently comprehensive, since this may 
require negotiating with or at the very least relating to former carers or 
biological parents in order to source or verify images and stories. There may be 
periods of a child’s life where there is little or no documentary evidence, or 
where, if it does exist, it is in a form that makes it highly problematic for 
inclusion in the life story book (e.g. photographs taken for official purposes 
which clearly depict the child as in a state of neglect or worse). This raises a 
dilemma – how are these gaps to be filled? Is it better to ‘tell things as they were’ 
or find an alternative way of managing the past?  
 
Extract 5 gives an illustration of such a dilemma. Here, three adoptive parents 
and a facilitator are discussing toys that adoptive children have brought with 
them from previous care settings. At the start of the extract, C describes a play 
costume currently favoured by her adopted daughter: 
 
 Extract 5 (from Brown, Reavey & Brookfield, 2013) 
C. My daughter’s obsessed with fire and um, we don’t talk, we don’t 
um, she’s actually got a fireman’s costume, a firefighter’s costume, 
a firefighter’s kit you know, age appropriate children’s things but I 
don’t talk about fires and there was, you now the New Town fire. 
Of course we haven’t mentioned it, haven’t shown her pictures but, 
um, today she was out visiting a friend who has a younger child 
and doesn’t realize how big ears she’s got and talking about, you 
know, those explosions there and the sky so she’s heard about it 
and we … and then um M had promised to show her a newspaper 
picture because she’s obsessed with it it. She just…  
B.  Amazing what they take in, isn’t it you know?  
A.  Its amazing … when she’s three  
C.  Yeah  
W.  It’s quite unsettling  
C.  Oh, but also you sort of think its alright because there’s this huge 
picture of like, like a mushroom and there’s three um firefighters 
in the picture and the main interest was one didn’t have his hat on! 
(Laughter) You have to think, you know  
A.  You’re building this up, yeah  
C.  Well, it’s like, well it’s like, you know what do I do when she’s, you 
know, talking to her about this, this sort of thing about what her 
mum did you know, I suppose it’s quite hard to talk to her without 
having an example apart from the drugs, having pictures and 
things like that, you know that sort of thing, other sorts of 
scenarios but um, she will hear about that because siblings, you 
know will, will tell her. Anytime really, but anytime and it is so, and 
I know that I’m doing it myself, I’m sort of visualizing it and I know 
I have to talk it down, the fact that she wasn’t an arsonist she had 
started a fire by mistake, you know, um it was the fact that she 
went much longer into distress, you know but the flat got burned 
down and the fact was she went to prison because of it and had a 
long sentence, so that’s unfortunate but you have to sort of try to 
work out  
 
C is concerned about her daughter dressing in the firefighter costume since she 
sees it as evidence of an ‘obsession’ with fire. There are good reasons for C to be 
concerned. What her daughter apparently does not (yet) know is that her birth 
mother served a prison sentence for arson. Whilst there is a complex story to be 
told around these circumstances, it is a not a discussion C is currently prepared 
to have with her daughter, despite its obvious relevance for her understanding of 
her early life and current circumstances. Allowing her to play with the costume is 
then a risk. In one sense it normalizes the past, by channelling the daughter’s 
interest in fire along age-appropriate and manageable routes. This strategy 
appears to be working – when shown pictures of firefighters, the daughter was 
primarily concerned with the state of their uniforms rather than the nature of 
their work. Neverless, children have ‘big ears’ and are exposed to influences and 
sources of information beyond the family home. At some point, the story of the 
birth mother will come out (most likely from other siblings). C is already 
anticipating this moment, she has ‘visualised’ it and rehearsed possible accounts 
she might offer to her daughter-in-the-future. 
 
As with extracts 3 & 4, we would point to the significance of the material artefact 
that is quite literally in play – the firefighter costume. This artefact is the locus of 
family pleasure and anxieties. The ‘secret’ of the fire setting by the birth mother 
is in a sense contained in the folds of the costume. At any moment it may 
articulated by siblings, or even perhaps remembered by the daughter herself. We 
have named these particular kinds of artefacts as ‘spectral objects’ (Brown et al, 
2013). Spectral objects are not objects in the usual sense of the term in that they 
appear to have a kind of agency of their own, which arises in part because of the 
residue of absent or phantom subjectivity left upon by the form by the actions or 
choices of former carers or biological parents (e.g. as with toys or clothes that 
have travelled with the child from previous care settings). What gives these 
objects their power is the very fact of their endurance across time. They make for 
material links to the past, which gives them unsettling holding power. Given this, 
C might very well be tempted to dispose of the firefighter costume. But in doing 
so she would render herself accountable at some future point for this decision to 
deny her daughter-in-the-future this material resource for making sense of her 
past. It is better then to allow her daughter to have the costume, because this will 
C to claim at a later point that she did not in fact keep anything from her 
daughter. The story of the birth mother was right there all along, simply hidden 
in plain sight. 
 
In summary, whilst our own work has its roots in the kind of analysis developed 
within Discursive Psychology, we feel that it is impossible to retain a purist focus 
on conversational pragmatics. To develop a properly ‘expanded view’ of memory 
it is necessary to return to the longstanding concern in psychology with ‘turning 
around’ on experience. Whilst we can show this being done ‘live’ in social 
interaction through discursive analysis, situating these acts in relation to 
ongoing experience, to lived autobiographical memory, means turning towards 
theory. And the more we do so, the more points of convergence we find with 
cognitive-experimental tradition, coming from its own very different direction of 
travel. 
 
Moving On? 
It is salutary to recognise that much of what concerns contemporary 
psychological approaches to memory can be seen ‘in a nutshell’ in the scaffolding 
experiments. Two people approach a task together. There is a knowledge 
asymmetry between them. They have a common set of material resources in 
play. One facilitates the other in ‘turning around’ on their experience. The 
instruction that is provided by one to the other draws on broader norms, and is 
embedded in a particular social practice. They are aware of a possible wider 
audience, that what they say now might have relevance to themselves and these 
others at a later date. Now change the set-up slightly. The parent and child are no 
longer in a laboratory, they are telling bed-time stories at home. Or perhaps the 
child is now adopted, and the parent is carefully negotiating the issue of their 
early life. Switch again, and this time we have a politician presenting their 
version of some past event to the media, conscious of the documents or other 
records that might be miraculously produced at any moment. Or yet again, we 
have elderly care home residents talking to their adult child about ‘the old days’, 
invoking artefacts and places that have not been seen in years. Once more, an 
adult is recalling a painful episode from their childhood with their therapist, or 
perhaps they are doing so in court, under cross-examination.  
 
At the heart of this endlessly re-iterated scene are matters that of are of deep and 
abiding concern to both the cognitive-experimental and discursive traditions. It 
is clear that that the vast majority of our actions are oriented both forwards and 
backwards across our unfolding experience. We seek to mobilise some version of 
our past in the present, and we anticipate what the future relevance might be of 
having done so, of what might be made of our present actions at some later 
point. The cognitive-experimental approach has quite properly made this 
ongoing work of stitching our lives together – the ‘critical developmental skill’ of 
autobiographical memory – its key object. For its part, the discursive tradition 
has shown the fine details of how this can be interactionally accomplished. 
However, we would argue that what is lacking is a treatment of experience that 
is properly sensitive to temporal flow (Bergson’s ‘duration’; Dewey’s ‘longitude 
and latitude of experience’), to the manner in which the present is continuously 
stretched forwards and backwards. Both traditions appear to isolate the act of 
recollection from this flow, whereas a cursory reflection on our own lives tell us 
that us that we have an emotional, embodied participation in this endless back 
and forth movement. 
 
There is little debate now that remembering is at base an activity of 
reconstruction. The cognitive-experimental approach has nevertheless 
sometimes found it necessary to insist that, in principle, it is possible to establish 
the veridicality of a given recollection (see Fivush & Neisser, 1994). For its part, 
the discursive tradition has at times appeared to be unconcerned to defend itself 
against the charge that in all cases, including memory, truth is no more than a 
matter of perspective (see Edwards et al, 1995). But in practice, work in both 
traditions has demonstrated that recollection is shaped by the constraints and 
affordances of the contexts where it is enacted, particularly when one party is 
more ‘in the know’ than the other. We think the way forward here is, following 
Singer & Conway (2008), to focus on the accessibility rather than the availability 
of autobiographical memory, and further to see accessibility as something that is 
collectively worked out, that may involve vicarious as well as direct experiences 
of the past, and that involves ethical and political dilemmas (as in the case of 
adoptive parents having to manage the future accessibility of the past for their 
adoptive children). To do so will also mean working with a far broader concept 
of context than either tradition currently allows, since any claim about the past, 
however trivial, may potentially come of relevance to wide range of social actors 
and hence result in a set of normative considerations being invoked during the 
course of recollection. We see this very clearly in all examples that involve adults 
and children remembering together. 
 
The broader concept of context leads us towards an intriguing proposition. 
Psychologists have long struggled with the questions of how best to define 
memory processes and the set of activities that constitute remembering. The 
socio-cultural insight that our capacity to remember is shaped by the kinds of 
cultural and material resources that are available to us casts these questions in a 
new light. The discursive tradition has shown that joint recall and conversational 
pragmatics blur the relation between ‘mind’ and ‘communication’. But the 
debates around extended cognition raise the stakes yet further - if what is 
loosely called ‘mind’ is really a name for some of the properties of an extended 
system in which the person is but one component (Michaelian & Sutton, 2013), 
then this invites speculation that autobiographical memory might not be a 
singular property. Our memorial capacities might, in a strong sense, be different 
as function of the settings and practices in which we engage. What we can do 
with our relationship to our personal past might then be radically different 
across settings such as classrooms, courts of law, therapeutic encounters, 
laboratories, art galleries and social media. Some hundred or so years ago, 
Bergson wondered if our ongoing flow of experience was better grasped as a set 
of intersecting, overlapping flows or durations. We are not a ‘thing’ that moves 
through time, but rather an ongoing pattern or series of knots made of diverse 
materials that repeats and reiterates as our life unfolds. What we are is the 
endless activity of scaffolding, rather than some structure buried underneath. 
The challenge is to produce a psychology of memory that can engage with this 
proposition.  
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i Roediger & Wheeler’s frustration was not entirely misplaced. Edwards & Potter 
had grudgingly formulated the ‘Discursive Action Model’ (DAM) in order to secure a 
publication with the prestigious journal Psychological Review (Edwards & Potter, 
1993), following the demands of initial reviewers for an explicit statement of theory. 
As the ironic title makes pretty clear (‘here’s your damn model!’), this was never 
really a model in any formal sense, being instead a set of analytic guidelines for 
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ii One of the student participants at the time was our colleague, the critical 
psychologist John Cromby. 
